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application of open heart surgery to human beings by several years.
Perhaps pound seizure is an economic issue. The purchase price of pound animals is small compared to the cost of a conditioned animal obtained from a dealer
or to the cost of a purpose-bred animal. The apparent economy of using pound animals in research is just that, apparent. In 1977, Bristol Laboratories (New York) reported that 59% of the 558 dogs and 75% of the 163 cats requisitioned from pounds
proved unsuitable for research. Another study (Lab An Care 79:506, 1969), produced
the following data: In an experiment involving open heart surgery to replace heart
valves, 79 out of 85 purebred labrador retrievers survived whereas only 55 of 75 conditioned mongrels survived. If one were to extrapolate this to 100 animals surviving
the experiment, one would have to start with 108 purebreds or 137 mongrels. The extra cost involved in performing surgery on 137 mongrels as opposed to 108
purebreds would have been the equivalent (in 1969) of the cost of sixty purebred
dogs, and this does not even include the surgeon's and technician's time, nor institutional overhead.
It has also been argued that the number of pound (random-source) animals required by research is very small compared with the number of animals that are
euthanized annually. Dr. Andrew Rowan (Institute for the Study of Animal Problems, Washington, DC) testifying at the Los Angeles City Council May 27, 1981,
made it clear that a very similar argument could be made for the millions of sewer
rats that are exterminated every year. Instead of poisoning them wastefully, they
could be trapped and used in research laboratories, but research scientists would
not welcome this idea because sewer rats (random-source rats) are not standardized
or characterized and are carriers of all sorts of diseases.
The Los Angeles Times accused City Council members of sentimentality when a
Council subcommittee unanimously voted to rescind the pound seizure ordinance.
Dr. Rowan, responding to this statement, told the City Council that if our decisions
are made without sentiment and compassion we have no right to call ourselves
human beings.
The deeper implications of this issue are revealed in the myopic irrationality
which motivates the advocates of pound seizure, for this sort of irresponsible behavior also perpetuates a number of negative practices which can have global consequences. Nature's love is unconditional, but her secrets are given only to those
who have earned her trust, yet look how we have abused that trust in the application of our knowledge of the atom. Therefore, as we go about trying to learn
Nature's secrets, whether in medicine or in physics, it might behoove us to remember the words of Albert Schweitzer when he spoke of the progress mankind could be
making if we had only a little more respect for life. He also said that it is the duty of
those (that use animals for research) to ponder in every separate case whether it is
really and truly necessary thus to sacrifice an animal for humanity.
On June 30,1981, the Los Angeles City Council voted 10-3 in favor of rescinding
the pound seizure ordinance, but added a codicil regretting that purpose-bred animals would now be doomed to the fate that pound animals had been spared.

Abnormal Behavior
as an Indication
of Immaterial Suffering
Hans Hinrich Sambraus
I do not believe that I am the only one who has occasionally been satisfied to
take three steps forward and two steps back. Despite the setback, "progress" of one
step has been made. At present, the task of animal welfare seems to me to be the
preservation of that small bit of progress. In the animal welfare laws of various
countries that have come into force in the last few years, terms like "appropriate
conditions" and "species-specific activity requirements" have appeared. (These are
the three steps forward.) Only the ethologist can determine what they mean in specific cases. But many ethologists who have never concerned themselves with animal
welfare problems also feel called upon to voice their opinions. Because the necessary competence is lacking, the resulting judgments are often very curious. Recently
a prominent ethologist felt obliged to contribute seven theses to the animal welfare
problem. Only a few excerpts will be quoted here (They constitute the two steps
back.):
"The animal welfare law that insures the safety and well-being of animals does
not protect the animal's legitimate interests, which we cannot even identify ... "
"The goal of animal welfare laws is not the well-being of all animals, but rather
the education of man with respect to humanity ... Cruelty to animals is forbidden only so that we will not become innured to it and be cruel to other people."
Is it really true that we cannot say anything about the pain and suffering of animals? And if we do say something about it, is it only speculation, or in any case not
objectively measurable?
I believe that much more than this can be said about the problem. Pain and suffering are feelings, and feelings as such cannot be ascertained by scientific/theoretical
means. This is not only true for our judgments concerning the feelings of animals,
but also for our judgments concerning the feelings of other people. One could argue
that man has language, and hence sufficient possibility to communicate. But we can
also simulate pain and suffering or avoid talking about that pain and suffering
which we feel. Deceptive behavior therefore leaves room for error in human judgment. But let us also consider preverbal children, the mentally retarded or people
whose language we do not understand. In these cases we can recognize pain and
suffering from certain symptoms. Some of these in humans include the following:
crying; clenched teeth; unusual movements (physical contortions); protection of
wounded area; direction of attention to painful spot (looking at, touching); and
breaking out in sweat. The same symptoms can also be witnessed in animals in corresponding situations. When a person confirms pain or suffering in another person
or in animals, it is done only through reasoning by analogy. We ourselves know how
it is to experience pain or to suffer, and also know our corresponding expressions.
When we see the same symptoms in animals or other people, we can conclude that
they are feeling approximately the same things that are familiar to us from our own
experiences.
Prof. Dr. Sambraus is at the Institute for Animal Breeding and Hygiene, University of Munich Veterinaerstrasse
13, 8000 Muenchen 22, FRG.
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Many scientists question the legitimacy of analogous reasoning with respect to
animals. The argument is founded on the attitude that humans and animals are basically different. But this is surely an outdated concept. There is constant confirmation and widespread agreement in the fields of morphology, histology and physiology that the differences between humans and "higher' vertebrate animals are slight.
The same holds true for behavioral patterns. The pharmaceutical industry tests
drugs intended for use on humans (including psychopharmacologicals) on animals
first. In the field of psychology one has arrived at much basic knowledge about the
human psyche through research on animals. These procedures are only permissible
and meaningful if analogies exist.
I do not want to exclude the possibility that one occasionally arrives at false interpretations when making judgments about pain and suffering in animals. But
where in the field of biology does one completely avoid error? Scientists attempt to
proceed as carefully as possible in their experiments, finally dealing with their findings statistically. It is possible that the results arrived at are significant, in which
case one acts as though the facts had been definitely explained. But this is seldom
the case. A certain probability of error is always present. Why should we apply more
stringent standards to questions concerning an animal's reaction to fear, suffering or
lack of well-being?
To this point I have spoken of pain and suffering. It is not generally doubted
that animals can experience pain although no one can objectively prove it. The case
in which symptoms of pain are registered while corresponding feelings of pain are
denied is certainly an exception. If an animal had just broken its leg, only a very few
people would fail to notice more than the fact that it cries, tends its leg and tries to
run away. Later one would ascertain a dull look, loss of appetite and lack of bodily
care. Every well-meaning person would conclude from these symptoms that the
animal is in pain and see to it that it is cared for so that the pain will pass. In this
respect the evaluation of "technopathies" is relatively simple. These are considered
to be diseases or disorders which are the result of poor husbandry. One could therefore pass legal guidelines as quickly as possible permitting only those systems of
animal husbandry which cause the slightest amount of technopathies.
But there is also suffering that is not morphologically or physiologically ascertainable. This "immaterial" suffering is considered only fleetingly, if at all, in questions of animal welfare. It is true, for instance, that German and Swiss animal
welfare laws call for species-specific diet and care as well as appropriate shelter,
and state that the activity requirements (BewegungsbedUrfnisse) may not be limited
so as to cause suffering. These laws show a basic recognition of immaterial suffering
as suffering which arises from an animal's inability to do something in its natural
behavioral repertoire. The difficulty is that there is nothing obviously clinically
identifiable about this kind of suffering- and only this kind of measure seems to
count. Lorenz also regretted this insufficiency: "The heresy exists in the opinion that
the real has existence only as that which can be expressed in exact, scientific terminology and mathematically quantified. In so doing one explains away the emotional as unreal illusion."' It in no way suffices that scientists committed to animal
welfare are convinced that immaterial suffering exists. The ethological signs of immaterial suffering must be made clear for others as well if animal welfare is to continue its progress.
Reactive abnormal behavior is the convincing proof of immaterial suffering for
the ethologist. We consider abnormal that behavior which does not correspond to,
246

/NT I STUD ANIM PROB 2(5) 1981

H.H. Sambraus

Comment

or is without object, which appears with sharply increased or decreased frequency,
or which is abnormal in its motor pattern. Moreover, much reactive abnormal
behavior manifests itself in stereotypies, i.e., the movement is repeated continuously in the same way. Among wild animals and in traditional forms of animal production abnormal behavior is unknown. However, it is encountered often in animals in
intensive husbandry systems, and it can be demonstrated that abnormal behavior is
actually brought about by conditions of husbandry. It first appears when animals
are transferred from good to poor conditions of husbandry. When the conditions are
improved the abnormality declines. Often, however, it remains to some extent for a
prolonged period even after conditions have been improved. Abnormal behavior is
then characterized as residual-reactive. The obstinacy with which the abnormality
remains is a further indication that the animal is highly neurotic.
Abnormal behavior appears frequently in two areas: feeding and locomotion.
Search for fodder, fodder intake, mastication and swallowing of food all belong to
feeding behavior. Abnormality can appear in each of these stages, be it empty chewing or bar-biting in sows (Fig. 1), cannibalism in fattening pigs, tongue rolling in cattle, sucking wind in horses or feather pecking in poultry. All these behaviors show
that the animal is frustrated. Similar to the above are "weaving" and mouth movements which appear in numerous species. These are stereotypies of locomotion in
animals that want to move forward but are prevented by confinement from doing so.

Figure 1
Sow biting the bar
of her box stall.
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first. In the field of psychology one has arrived at much basic knowledge about the
human psyche through research on animals. These procedures are only permissible
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I do not want to exclude the possibility that one occasionally arrives at false interpretations when making judgments about pain and suffering in animals. But
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proceed as carefully as possible in their experiments, finally dealing with their findings statistically. It is possible that the results arrived at are significant, in which
case one acts as though the facts had been definitely explained. But this is seldom
the case. A certain probability of error is always present. Why should we apply more
stringent standards to questions concerning an animal's reaction to fear, suffering or
lack of well-being?
To this point I have spoken of pain and suffering. It is not generally doubted
that animals can experience pain although no one can objectively prove it. The case
in which symptoms of pain are registered while corresponding feelings of pain are
denied is certainly an exception. If an animal had just broken its leg, only a very few
people would fail to notice more than the fact that it cries, tends its leg and tries to
run away. Later one would ascertain a dull look, loss of appetite and lack of bodily
care. Every well-meaning person would conclude from these symptoms that the
animal is in pain and see to it that it is cared for so that the pain will pass. In this
respect the evaluation of "technopathies" is relatively simple. These are considered
to be diseases or disorders which are the result of poor husbandry. One could therefore pass legal guidelines as quickly as possible permitting only those systems of
animal husbandry which cause the slightest amount of technopathies.
But there is also suffering that is not morphologically or physiologically ascertainable. This "immaterial" suffering is considered only fleetingly, if at all, in questions of animal welfare. It is true, for instance, that German and Swiss animal
welfare laws call for species-specific diet and care as well as appropriate shelter,
and state that the activity requirements (BewegungsbedUrfnisse) may not be limited
so as to cause suffering. These laws show a basic recognition of immaterial suffering
as suffering which arises from an animal's inability to do something in its natural
behavioral repertoire. The difficulty is that there is nothing obviously clinically
identifiable about this kind of suffering- and only this kind of measure seems to
count. Lorenz also regretted this insufficiency: "The heresy exists in the opinion that
the real has existence only as that which can be expressed in exact, scientific terminology and mathematically quantified. In so doing one explains away the emotional as unreal illusion."' It in no way suffices that scientists committed to animal
welfare are convinced that immaterial suffering exists. The ethological signs of immaterial suffering must be made clear for others as well if animal welfare is to continue its progress.
Reactive abnormal behavior is the convincing proof of immaterial suffering for
the ethologist. We consider abnormal that behavior which does not correspond to,
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or is without object, which appears with sharply increased or decreased frequency,
or which is abnormal in its motor pattern. Moreover, much reactive abnormal
behavior manifests itself in stereotypies, i.e., the movement is repeated continuously in the same way. Among wild animals and in traditional forms of animal production abnormal behavior is unknown. However, it is encountered often in animals in
intensive husbandry systems, and it can be demonstrated that abnormal behavior is
actually brought about by conditions of husbandry. It first appears when animals
are transferred from good to poor conditions of husbandry. When the conditions are
improved the abnormality declines. Often, however, it remains to some extent for a
prolonged period even after conditions have been improved. Abnormal behavior is
then characterized as residual-reactive. The obstinacy with which the abnormality
remains is a further indication that the animal is highly neurotic.
Abnormal behavior appears frequently in two areas: feeding and locomotion.
Search for fodder, fodder intake, mastication and swallowing of food all belong to
feeding behavior. Abnormality can appear in each of these stages, be it empty chewing or bar-biting in sows (Fig. 1), cannibalism in fattening pigs, tongue rolling in cattle, sucking wind in horses or feather pecking in poultry. All these behaviors show
that the animal is frustrated. Similar to the above are "weaving" and mouth movements which appear in numerous species. These are stereotypies of locomotion in
animals that want to move forward but are prevented by confinement from doing so.

Figure 1
Sow biting the bar
of her box stall.
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Dr. Roger A. Mugford
Some abnormal behavior is prevented through force. Tongue-rolling cattle
receive a ring in the frenulum under the tongue which causes pain, resulting in reduction of the abnormal activity. The muscles of the pharynx are severed in horses
to prevent them from sucking wind. Intervention of this sort is unsatisfactory from
the ethologist's point of view. It eliminates the symptom only; the cause of the ailment remains. The animal has the right to an alteration in the conditions that provoke abnormal behavior. In some cases a prevented abnormality is replaced by another. The conditions of husbandry for fattening pigs are generally so poor that cannibalism is almost unavoidable. That is why the piglet's tail is docked. Economic
losses are thus prevented, but not the active animal's tendency to bite. A frequent
result is that the pigs begin biting the joints, ears or vaginas of animals in neighboring stalls. In some cases the tendency to bite and root up leads to anal massage of
other pigs (Fig. 2). This results in a bloody, inflamed anus of the affected pig, which
loses its appetite and does not grow in the desired manner. Economic losses still occur although abnormal behavior, namely tail biting, has been prevented. It is a mistake to believe that only the animal whose tail is bitten suffers; the active animal
also suffers.
As early as 1968 M. Fox wrote a book entitled Abnormal Behavior in Animals. In
spite of this valuable and highly respected work we still know very little of the
relevance of abnormal behavior to animal welfare. Animal welfare means helping
suffering animals. But we can only help them if we know exactly when they are suffering. Abnormal behavior is a key to recognizing suffering in animals. We still have
a long way to go before we can more closely describe and understand the
significance of all abnormal behavior. We have still a longer way to go to convince
producers and legislators that conditions of animal husbandry leading to immaterial
suffering too must be changed.
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The choke chain has come to be regarded as an indispensable aid to training dogs,
but even the most time-hallowed practices deserve an occasional critical review.
The author has recently completed an investigation into the uses and abuses of
choke chains, and failed to find any benefit from using a choker rather than a conventional leather collar. Indeed, there are some very considerable dangers and disadvantages associated with the device. These charges may sound like heresy to
many dog-trainers, but to others, it may strike a sympathetic chord.

Canine Body Language
In nature, the wolf does not adorn itself with a collar, so we must presume that
the body postures and sensitivities of the dog have evolved without collars in mind.
Wolves and dogs communicate by the position and hair cover on the body and tail,
by facial expressions and chemical signals. They are not particularly vocal; thus
their response to complex voice commands from human beings does not come easily or naturally. One can conclude therefore, that the traditions of spoken commands and tugs at the neck of a dog do not exploit the natural response tendencies
of the species.

Leash Pulling
There are some very good reasons why a dog should not be allowed to walk in
front of its owner: it is an expression of leadership or dominance over the owner, the
dog is exposed to potential danger and the owner could get very tired arms. In practice, very many owners fail to train their dog not to pull on the leash, despite making
conscientious efforts to do so. Why should this be so? Perhaps it is because the objectives of training have been wrongly stated or are misunderstood by the dog owners .
In idealistic terms, the behavioral objective of leash-training is to teach the dog
that proximity to the body or the legs of the owner is rewarding and being out in
front of the owner is unrewarding. The objective should most certainly not be for
the dog to learn an association between a vocal command 'HEEL' and a painful sensation to the neck, but of course that is the approach most commonly taken by
many dog trainers. There is an important distinction between the two.
In practice, the proximity-training approach to stop leash pulling proceeds as
follows:
a. Use a leash which is sufficiently long for the dog to pass its hindquarters
beyond the feet of its owner.
b. Use a broad collar which physically stops movement of the dog forward, but
without causing undue pain.
c. Command 'HEEL' while braking the dog with its collar and moving alongside
and in front of the dog.
d. Reward it with praise, food or other positive reinforcement when the dog
has been passed by the owner.
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Dr. Mugford is Consultilnt in Animal Behaviour, "Fletcher's Coombe," Diptford, Nr. Totnes, South Devon
TQ9 7NQ, UK. This article is reprinted with permission of the author and the publisher from Animals
{RSPCA) Issue 6 Winter 1980.
Figure 2 Anal massage of a fattening pig kept under poor housing conditions.

/NT

248

/NT

1 STUD

ANIM PROB 2{5} 1981

1 STUD

ANIM PROB 2{5) 1981

249

